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EQUAL PROTECTION IN TRANSITION: AN ANALYSIS
AND A PROPOSAL
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution contains three
of the most important and controversial clauses to be found in the entire docu-
ment: equal protection, due process, and privileges and immunities. Thus, it is
not surprising that the judicial history of the amendment since its ratification
in 1868, has been one of constant definition and redefinition, interpretation and
reinterpretation. As the then Professor Frankfurter stated it:
The words of these provisions are so unrestrained, either by their intrinsic meaning,
or by their history, or by tradition, that they leave the individual Justice free, if, in-
deed, they do not actually compel him, to fill in the vacuum with his own controlling
conceptions .... 1
While the intrinsic meaning of concepts such as fairness and equality remains
unclear, and the historical debate is far from concluded, tradition or rather prec-
edent has deprived the equal protection clause of the fledbility required to
meet new issues. It is the thesis of this Comment that by way of response to
this dilemma the equal protection decisions of the 1971-1972 term of the Su-
preme Court2 are harbingers of a new approach to equal protection adjudica-
tion.
HI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUAL
PROTECTION STANDARDS
The Supreme Court's first pronouncement as to the meaning of the equal
protection clause occurred in the Slaughter-House Case where, although pri-
marily concerned with interpreting the privileges and immunities clause, Mr.
Justice Miller, in a statement noteworthy for its historical4 rather than predic-
tive accuracy, said:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimina-
tion against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, Will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision.5
1. Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Justice Holmes' Constitutional Opinions, 36 Harv. L.
Rev. 909, 914 (1923) (footnote omitted).
2. See cases cited at notes 87-88 infra.
3. 83 US. (16 WalL) 36 (1873).
4. "Although there is little doubt that Republicans would have approved of restraints
upon regulation of business had they thought of it, we have not found anywhere even a
single intimation that this possibility did in fact occur to them. In other words, there was
no contemporary understanding of the relation of equal protection to business regulation."
Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," So Colum.
L. Rev. 131, 143 (1950) (footnote omitted).
5. 83 U.S. at 81. As Thomas Reed Powell said of Justice Miller's pronouncement: "Not-
withstanding this early judicial doubt, the members of the race for whom the clause was
primarily designed have shared its protection lavishly with others." Powell, The Supreme
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It was not until 1886 that the potential for using the equal protection clause
as a check upon the police power of a state began to be realized. Then, in
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,6 the Court invalidated a San Francisco ordinance which,
although on its face a neutral regulation of the operation of laundries in wooden
buildings, had been applied so as to discriminate against Chinese proprietors.
In that same year, the Court, in Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific R.R.,7 accepted
without discussion the proposition that corporations were persons within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment.8
The period from 1889 to 19189 saw a vast proliferation in the number of
equal protection challenges' 0 to state economic regulation. Although a few of
these cases resulted in findings of unconstitutional discrimination, 11 the great
bulk of the statutes were upheld.12 At the same time that the Court slowly
expanded the scope of the equal protection clause to protect corporations, it
began in cases such as Barbier v. Connolly'3 and Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co.,'4 to explicate the basic guidelines for evaluating an equal protection
challenge. Under this traditional approach, which the Court still employs, anal-
Court and State Police Power, 1922-1930 (pt. IX), 18 Va. L. Rev. 597, 635 (1932) [herein-
after cited as Powell, State Police Power].
6. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
7. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
8. Id. at 396. See Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment
(pts. 1-2), 47 Yale L.j. 371, 48 Yale L.J. 171 (1938).
9. The primary source utilized in the compilation of the number of statutes invalidated
under the equal protection clause was Legislative Reference Service, The Constitution of
the United States, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1403-1537 (1964, Small & Jayson
eds.). Other sources are noted when relied upon.
10. Professor Warren found that between 1889 and 1918 inclusive, there were over 790
Supreme Court decisions under the due process and equal protection clauses. 2 C. Warren,
The Supreme Court in United States History 741 (1926). See also Warren, The Progressive-
ness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 Colum. L. Rev. 294 (1913). It is difficult to
distinguish which cases relied upon equal protection rather than due process, or due process
rather than equal protection, in that violation of both clauses was alleged as a matter of
course. In fact, however, the due process issue was usually predominant. See text accom-
panying notes 23-27 infra. This constant inclusion of near frivolous equal protection claims
caused Justice Holmes to reflect that "[ilt is the usual last resort of constitutional argu-
ments .... " Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
11. There were approximately six economic statutes invalidated during this period.
See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56 (1915) (invalidating a
statute permitting shipper to recover attorney's fee from carrier but not permitting carrier
to do the same); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902) (statute exempting
agricultural products and live stock raisers from antitrust laws), questioned, Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
12. See Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 Colum. L.
Rev. 294 (1913). See also B. Moore, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Legislation
(1913).
13. 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
14. 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
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ysis1 5 of the challenged statute begins with the identification of the trait which
forms the basis of the legislative classification.10 Next, an attempt is made to
ascertain the purpose17 of the law; and finally, the relationship of the purpose
to the trait is scrutinized. Under this test, "[t]he constitutional safeguard is
offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective," 18 and there is no reasonable basis which
can be found to justify the classification.19 Additionally, the statute is presumed
to be constitutional and the burden of proving the irrationality of the classi-
fication is upon the party bringing the challenge.20 As Professors Tussman and
tenBroek put it in their now classic treatment of the equal protection clause:
The essence of that doctrine can be stated with deceptive simplicity. The Constitu-
tion does not require that things different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. But it does require, in its concern for equality, that those who are
similarly situated be similarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a classifi-
cation is the degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly situated.2 '
From 1918 to 1937, the Court utilized the traditional test as a "shield" in
order "to protect interests of business and property against discriminatory state
action. '22 The period from 1931 to 1937 inclusive stands out in that during
those eight years the Court invalidated eleven state tax and economic regulatory
statutes23 compared with only twelve invalidations from the date of the amend-
15. The formulation of the paradigmatic equal protection approach is found in Tussman
& tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 344-53 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as Tussman & tenBroek].
16. It is not always clear what trait the classification has been based upon. Cf. Bode v.
National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 US. 1019
(1972).
17. "The purpose of a law may be either the elimination of a public 'mischlie' or the
achievement of some positive public good." Tussman & tenBroek 346. It is also possible
that the purpose of a statute could in and of itself be impermissible.
18. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 US. 420, 425 (1961). See also Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 US. 61, 78 (1911).
19. As the Court stated in Lindsley: "[ilf any state of facts reasonably can be conceived
that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted
must be assumed." 220 U.S. at 78. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 US. 464 (1948);
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 US. 552 (1947).
20. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 US. 802, 808-09 (1969); Linddley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 US. 61, 79 (1911).
21. Tussman & tenBroek 344 (footnote omitted).
22. R. Harris, The Quest for Equality 58 (1960).
23. See, e.g., Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 US. 266 (1936) (invalidating
statute excluding newly formed corporations from the coverage of a statute permitting
small milk dealers to undersell larger ones); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 US. 517 (1933)
(invalidating in part a Florida chain store tax); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 US. 553 (1931) (in-
validating statute exempting vehicles carrying fish and milk from insurance requirements).
It is interesting to note that Brandeis, Cardozo and Stone (except for two cases in which Stone
did not participate) dissented from all of the invalidations save Smith v. Cahoon, which was
unanimous.
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ment's enactment to 1930.24 This is not to suggest that the Court usually relied
upon the equal protection clause when invalidating state statutes. On the con-
trary, it was substantive due process with its requirement that legislation be
"a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State
S. 25 that provided the basis for these decisions. In fact, between 1918 and
1937 when the Court relied upon the equal protection clause less than twenty
times to declare statutes unconstitutional, it turned to substantive due process
in more than one hundred cases.26 This, as Professor Powell said at the time,
"indicates the comparative unimportance of the clause."2 7
From the point of view of both equal protection and due process as checks
upon state social and economic legislation, the "constitutional revolution ' '"8
of 1937 resulted in an almost total abandonment of the Court's exercise of the
reviewing function, thereby practically guaranteeing a finding of constitutional-
ity.2 9 As a result, the case of Morey v. Doud,30 wherein the Court struck down
an Illinois statute which specifically exempted the American Express Company
from the requirements of licensing and regulation in the sale of money orders,
is the only instance of a state statute embodying economic regulations being
invalidated on either due process or equal protection grounds since 1938.1
During the same time span a small number of state tax statutes were held
to be invidiously discriminatory, 32 but prior to the Court's 1971-1972 term no
state social legislation had been found unconstitutional in a decision explicitly
applying the traditional standard. There were, however, four equal protection
decisions- in which the Court invalidated state statutes without explaining
24. See, e.g., Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929) (invalidating statute
requiring individuals to obtain licenses for operating cotton gins, but exempting stock
cooperatives); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35 (1922)
(invalidating statute requiring that railroads pay opponent's attorney's fee on appeal not-
withstanding the railroads' success in the appellate court). See Powell, State Police Power.
25. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
26. This approximation was arrived at by a comparison of the statistics in B. Wright,
The Growth of American Constitutional Law 113, 154 (1942) with those presented by
Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 Colurn. L. Rev. 294
(1913).
27. Powell, State Police Power 631.
28. See E. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. (1941),
29. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 34, commenting that since 1937 the Court's decisions in
the areas of substantive due process and equal protection have left "little doubt as to the
practical result: no claim of substantive economic rights would now be sustained by the
Supreme Court. The judiciary had abdicated the field." Id. at 38.
30. 354 U.S. 457 (1957); see text accompanying notes 81-85 infra.
31. G. Gunther & N. Dowling, Constitutional Law 981 (8th ed. 1970). See also 42 Minn.
L. Rev. 1174 (1958).
32. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949); Hilsborough v.
Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946). See generally R. Harris, supra note 22, at 57-81. But see
Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 532 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring).
33. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
[Vol. 41
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whether it was using the traditional or active review standard. While these cases
were generally disregarded by both the Court and the commentators, it is sug-
gested that they in fact presaged the "new" equal protection test discussed
herein 34
In 1932, at the nadir of the use of due process as a substantive check upon
state legislation, Thomas Reed Powell observed that "[e]qual protection and
due process are handmaidens that help each other with their tasks. One may
be doing less only because the other is doing more.' 3 By 1942, however, with
the Court having firmly rejected substantive due process, and applying the
equal protection clause with extreme deference to legislative judgments, both
were doing less, and neither was doing more. Thus, when the Court was faced,
in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,30 with a statute permitting steriliza-
tion of felons who had been convicted three times, but exempting certain
white collar crimes from its coverage, the equal protection and due process
clauses did not provide viable authority for invalidating the statute.3 7 Justice
Douglas, however, found that procreation was "one of the basic civil rights of
man" 38 and revitalized the equal protection clause by demanding "strict scru-
tiny' 9 rather than a rational relationship. Skinner was, as Gunther and Dowling
have said, "potent seed." 40 It was conceived in the vacuum left by the Court's
rejection of substantive due process, and it grew into the strict scrutiny or ac-
tive review equal protection standard.
Under this test,41 the rationality of the purpose-classification relationship is
not at issue; rather, the burden is placed squarely upon the state to demon-
strate that the statute "promote[s] a compelling governmental interest,"42 that
391 U.S. 73 (1968); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966).
34. See text accompanying notes 163-76 infra.
35. Powell, State Police Power 640.
36. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
37. Cf. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
21, 43 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]. See also note 29 supra.
38. 316 US. at 541.
39. Id.
40. Gunther & Dowling, supra note 31, at 1032.
41. See generally Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal
Services and Wealth, 7 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 103 (1972) (hereinafter cited as
Evolution of Equal Protection]; Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv.
L. Rev. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Developments--Equal Protection].
42. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis omitted). See also Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972). In comparison, see the language of the Court in Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), wherein the strict standard was said to require that the
classification be "reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives
in order to pass constitutional muster." Id. at 144. The use of "reasonable" to modify
"necessary" and "legitimate" rather than "compelling" could indicate a more lenient
application of the strict review standard.
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the classification is "necessary" to promote that interest,4 3 and that there is no
"reasonable [way] to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitution-
ally protected activity .. ."44 The determination as to whether a statute is
to be tested under the strict scrutiny or traditional approach turns upon an
examination of the trait used as the basis of the classification, and the nature
of the interest affected by the classifying statute. If the classifying trait is one
deemed "suspect" as are race,45 alienage,40 and national origin,47 or if the statute
impinges upon a "fundamental interest" such as the right to travel,48 the right
to vote,49 the right to procreate 50 or the rights of criminal defendants,5 1 then
the statute is said to "trigger" active review. On the other hand, if neither a
suspect classification nor a fundamental right are at issue, the statute is tested
under the traditional restrained review approach. Using this two-tiered approach
there is never an independent decision to employ the traditional test, there
is only the determination as to whether or not active review is called for.
The basic distinction between the two approaches is that while the traditional
test requires that those who "are similarly situated be similarly treated,"52 ac-
tive review demands that the state justify by a compelling governmental interest
any impingement upon fundamental rights or the creation of suspect classifica-
tions. 53 Thus, it is only the traditional approach that even purports to concern
itself with equality, or more precisely, with distinctions among people and the
relationship of purposes to classifications. Active review, on the other hand, is
similar to the due process of the 1930's in that it imposes " ' substantive' limits
upon the exercise of the police power.'"54 From a practical point of view, where
the traditional test is easy to satisfy, the active review standard is an exacting
one which places "a heavy burden of justification . . . on the State, and
43. 394 U.S. at 634.
44. 405 U.S. at 343; cf. Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 Yale
L.J. 464 (1969).
45. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
46. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
47. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948).
48. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
49. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Free School Dist.,
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
50. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 US. 535 (1942).
51. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 US. 235 (1970); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
52. Tussman & tenBroek 344.
53. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
54. Tussman & tenBroek 343. Justice Harlan was very critical of this development and
termed this use of equal protection a "'wolf in sheep's clothing'" and a "masquerade ...
for subjective judicial judgment .... ." Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259 (1970) (con-
curring opinion) (emphasis deleted). Justice Harlan's use of a due process rationale in
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), derives from, and is a partial vindication of,
the above.
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[emphasizes] that the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted
purposes."5 5 To date, application of the strict review standard has in every case
resulted in a finding of unconstitutionality. As Chief Justice Burger stated last
term: "So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly
insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less
than perfection."56
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE Two-TomxR APPROACH
If one had to identify a common theme running throughout the constitutional
decisions of the Warren Court it would surely be egalitarianism. From the de-
mise of separate but equal in Brown v. Board of Education57 to the birth of
one man one vote in Baker v. Car 58 and its progeny,59 the Court brought the
"egalitarian revolution" 60 to bear on numerous political and social problems.
Many were critical of the path taken,6' but as Professor Kurland has recently
commented, "[t]o the extent that the Warren Court has opened new frontiers,
it has been in the development of the concept of equality as a constitutional
standard." 62 At the same time, however, the Court can be charged with "failures
of method" 63 in its handling of the equal protection issue. As it had evolved
by the late 1960's, the two-tiered approach suffered from a fatal lack of flexi-
bility. Those statutes involving suspect classifications or fundamental interests
were reflexively found unconstitutional, while all others were almost sure to be
found devoid of equal protection defects. As one three-judge court put it in
1970: "There is something rigid about today's law regarding constitutional
reasonability, courts being forced to choose between the strict standard of Sha-
piro [v. Thompson"] and the highly permissive one of Carmichael [v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co.65 ]." 66
While the Court was recently undergoing rapid changes in personnel, there
were no indications that the two-tiered equal protection test was not to be re-
55. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 US. 330, 343 (1972).
56. Id. at 363-64 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
57. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
58. 369 US. 186 (1962).
59. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
60. The phrase is from Professor Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term-Foreword:
"Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the
Government," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 144 (1964).
61. For critiques of the effectiveness of the Court's use of equal protection see, eg.,
A. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 13-14, 103-81 (1970); Kurland,
Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined,
35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 583 (1968). Contra, Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition,
and the Supreme Court, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 769, 791-93 (1971).
62. P. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court 98 (1970).
63. Bickel, supra note 61, at 11.
64. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
65. 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
66. Romero v. Hodgson, 319 F. Supp. 1201, 1202 (NJ). Cal. 1970), aff'd mem., 403 U.S.
901 (1971).
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tained. The test's inflexibility was increasing, however, and decisions such as
Dandridge v. Williams,67 James v. Valtierra"8 and Lindsey v. Normel00 strongly
suggested that the Court would be hesitant to find new suspect classifications
or fundamental interests. This had the effect of freezing the nature of equal
protection challenges which would be accorded strict scrutiny, and thus relegat-
ing all others to consideration under the traditional standard and almost certain
validation of the statute under attack.70 Some commentators, in fact, took these
decisions as a portent of the "increasing submergence of the equal protection
clause at the hands of the Burger Court . . . .
It is thus not surprising that the development of an alternative approach had
been urged by Mr. Justice Marshall in his dissent in Dandridge v. Williams72
and reiterated last term in Richardson v. Belcher.73 In Dandridge, Marshall
criticized what he termed the "abstract" and "a priori" nature of the two-
tiered approach 4 which had permitted the majority to state that "social welfare"
statutes would be evaluated by the same rational basis test as statutes involv-
ing economic regulations, notwithstanding the admission that the alleged dis-
crimination against large families in the distribution of funds under the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children Program involved "the most basic eco-
nomic needs of impoverished human beings."70 As Justice Marshall put it in
Richardson v. Belcher: "Judges should not ignore what everyone knows, namely
that legislation regulating business cannot be equated with legislation dealing
with destitute, disabled, or elderly individuals." 70 In addition to the limitations
of the two-tiered approach in dealing with social welfare statutes, analysis of
those cases decided since 193777 in which the Court purported to apply the
67. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a Maryland statute placing a ceiling on funds
payable to a single family under Aid to Families with Dependent Children, thereby allocating
less money per child in larger families). One commentator termed Dandridge the "enfant
terrible of the Burger Court . . . ." Evolution of Equal Protection 127 (italics ommitted).
68. 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding a California constitutional provision requiring a
local referendum before low rent housing could be built and refusing to denominate wealth
a suspect classification).
69. 405 U.S. 56 (1972). The Court rejected the contention that the right to housing
was fundamental. "[Tlhe Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill. . . . Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing
and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions."
Id. at 74.
70. Contra, Evolution of Equal Protection 127-30, 144-46.
71. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 3, 134 (1971). See also Goodpaster,
The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's Right of
Free Access to the Courts, 56 Iowa L. Rev. 223, 223-25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Good-
paster].
72. 397 U.S. at 520-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. 404 U.S. 78, 90-92 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74. 397 U.S. at 520-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 485 (opinion of the Court).
76. 404 U.S. at 90; see text accompanying notes 63-66 supra; cf. Goodpaster 247-48.
77. Decisions prior to 1937 also failed to actually apply the traditional approach with
[Vol. 41
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traditional equal protection test discloses that rarely, if ever, does the Court
actually consider whether or not there was a rational relationship between the
statutory purpose and classification.7 8 Rather, in almost all instances the Court
has used James Bradley Thayer's rule of "clear mistake.?'" That is, the Court,
regardless of the purpose-classification relationship, exercises extreme judicial
restraint and upholds the statute unless "those who have the right to make laws
have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,-so clear
that it is not open to rational question." 80 Even the decision in Morey v.
Doud,81 where the Court found a lack of rational relationship, fails to evince
adherence to the often repeated traditional test. In Morey, the Court struck
down a statute which seemed to have rationally taken account of the preemi-
nence of the American Express Company in the business of selling money
orders.82 As one commentator has described the decisional process in Morey:
The dissent and the majority opinions proceed from the same general rules, but they
reach opposite results because neither the general contours of equal protection nor
judicial glosses on it are subject to calculation in mathematical exactitude or logical
symmetry.m
Of even more importance is the observation that Morey gives "the impression
that the court changes the rules without notice and smuggles in values other
than those permitted by the theory."8 4 Thus, if "intelligibility is an important
criterion of judicial action, the classical test is a questionable technique. " 85 In
light of the uncertainties resulting from the application of the traditional test,
as well as its rigidity and lack of analytic coherence, there was a pressing
need for a viable alternative if the Court was to effectively utilize the equal
any consistency. See Tussman & tenBroek 368-73. See also Note, Legislative Purpose,
Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 Yale L.J. 123 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Legislative Purpose].
78. It has been argued that "[c]ourts do not in fact use the rationality requirement to
strike down statutes, because it is impossible to do so." Note, Legislative Purpose 154.
While it is agreed that the Court has been unsuccessful in applying the rational basis test
consistently, it will be argued that it can be reformulated so as to be an effective judicial
tool. See the discussion of the reformulated equal protection test at text accompanying
notes 156-255 infra.
79. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893); see A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 35-46 (1962).
80. Thayer, supra note 79, at 144. As Charles Black has written of Thayer's rule: "An
automatic and invariable 'deference to the legislature,' rationalized to suit the occasion, is
the precise logical and practical equivalent of the withdrawal by the courts from the function
of reviewing statutes for constitutionality." C. Black, The People and the Court 208 (1960).
81. 354 US. 457 (1957).
82. See J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education 327
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Coons, Clune & Sugarman].
83. Harris, supra note 22, at 68.
84. Coons, Clune & Sugarman 328.
85. Id. For a similar analysis of Morey v. Doud see R. Dixon, Democratic Representa-
tion 148-49 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Dixon].
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protection clause as a check upon state statutes which neither impinge on fun-
damental interests nor rest upon suspect classifications.
IV. Reed v. Reed, Eisenstadt v. Baird AND AN
OUTLINE FOR A NEw EQUAL PRoTEcTION ALTERNATIVE
Until the 1971 term of the Supreme Court, the observation that the "func-
tional differences between the two standards of judicial review [of equal pro-
tection cases were] so great that in any case the choice of a standard [was]
likely to determine the ultimate decision"80 correctly described the practical
reality of the manner in which the Court was applying the two-tiered or
bipartite approach. During the 1971 term, however, in six" of the nine88 equal
protection cases decided without the invocation of the strict scrutiny test,80
the Court found the challenged statutes violative of the equal protection clause.0o
Analysis of these decisions, with special emphasis upon Reed v. Reed,9' and
Eisenstadt v. Baird,92 strongly suggests that either the Court employed a
new equal protection test or that it has significantly revised the traditional
approach.9 3
In Reed, the Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to declare
that classifications based upon sex were suspect and thus trigger active review. 4
Although the Court refused to take this step, it nevertheless unanimously in-
86. Evolution of Equal Protection 113.
87. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (invalidating and upholding in part);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
88. The three cases in which the challenged statutes were upheld are: Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). In Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Court also
upheld part of the challenged statute.
89. The strict scrutiny cases from the 1971 term are: Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); and its companion case, Britt v. North
Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
90. The cases of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); and Humphrey v. Cady,
405 U.S. 504 (1972), have been omitted from consideration. The former because It Is a
due process rather than an equal protection decision, and the latter because it resulted In
a remand and contains little analysis. For a discussion of the criteria used in the compilation
of a similar list see Gunther 11 n.48.
91. 404 US. 71 (1971).
92. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
93. The Court in Eisenstadt said: "But just as in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
we do not have to address the statute's validity under that [the active review] test because
the law fails to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection standard." 405 U.S. at 447 n.7.
94. Many commentators had urged this outcome. See, e.g., Note, Sex Discrimination
and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1499,
1516 (1971); Comment, Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 481 (1971).
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validated an Idaho statute which required a mandatory preference for males
over females, "without regard to their individual qualifications as potential
estate administrators,195 -when a male and a female of equal entitlement and
qualifications had both filed applications for letters of administration. The
Court accepted Idaho's contention that the statutory purpose was to reduce
probate court workloads by eliminating certain contests as to who would be
the administrator. It held, however, that to do so by discriminating on the
basis of sex was "to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice for-
bidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... '*a
Such a holding does not seem logically debatable, but it is difficult to reconcile
'with earlier decisions on sex discrimination such as Goesaert v. Cleary97 and
Hoyt v. Floridas98 which "suggest an almost unlimited range of legislative
discretion in making distinctions on the basis of sex in all phases of govern-
mental activity." 99 Thus, while the Court refused to denominate sex a suspect
classification, it did say, if only for the purpose of being an administrator, men
and women are similarly situated and therefore must be similarly treated. The
most important issue in Reed, however, was who bears the burden of proof as
to the purpose-classification relationship; that is, does the state have to show
that there is a distinction between men and women which warrants different
treatment, or must the plaintiff show that there is no difference between the
sexes which is rationally related to the statutory purpose? As Professor Reinstein
has cogently argued, the burden of proof issue is crucial in practically every
constitutional decision:
the results of significant cases, as well as much of their precedential value, can now
be viewed in retrospect as having turned on how the Court treated the evidence upon
which each side relied. How heavy a presumption of constitutionality was afforded
to the state; would the Court look beyond the record and accept an argument of mere
rationality; or was the state required to produce evidence to justify its actions .... 1,0
If the test used in Reed and followed in Eisenstadt does in fact put the
burden of justification on the state, 0 1 then Reed stands for the proposition
that there is a "general obligation to treat the sexes alike,"10 2 and it is for
95. 404 US. at 74.
96. Id. at 76.
97. 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a statute barring most women from being bartenders).
98. 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a statute exempting women from jury duty unless
they specifically requested it).
99. Harris, supra note 22, at 76.
100. Reinstein, The Welfare Cases: Fundamental Rights, the Poor, and the Burden of
Proof in Constitutional Litigation, 44 Temp. L.Q. 1, 3 (1970). See also P. Freund, Review
of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in Supreme Court and Supreme Law 47-54 (E. Cahn ed.
1954) ; Dixon 133-34, 148-49.
101. See text accompanying note 214 infra for an example of the state meeting the
burden.
102. Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir.) (Duniway, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for a hearing), vacated and remanded on issue of mootness,
41 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. Dec. 18, 1972).
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the state to satisfactorily explain any disparate treatment.103 Taking this ap-
proach rather than declaring sex itself to be a suspect classification has much
to commend it. The test used in Reed affords the Court greater flexibility in
dealing with the more complex issues of sex discrimination that are sure to
arise in the future than it would have under an active review standard triggered
by a suspect classification. At the same time, it renders it likely that statutes
based upon male-female distinctions without differences will be struck down.
104
Thus, through the use of a new equal protection standard, the Court was able
to state its opposition to sex discrimination, 05 without setting a precedent
which could too rigidly determine the pattern for future developments, 100 be
they in the form of judicial decisions, state and federal legislation, or a con-
stitutional amendment.
Writing for a unanimous Court in Reed, Chief Justice Burger, in a paragraph
quoted in its entirety by the Court in Eisenstadt,0 7 explicated the following
formula for testing statutes under the equal protection clause:
In applying that clause, this Court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of persons in
different ways. The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny
to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed
by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of that statute. A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).108
The reliance on the Guano case and the quotation of its language is both
unusual and revealing. Between 1943 and 1971 Guano was cited only four
103. See also Sedler, The Legal Dimensions of Women's Liberation: An Overview,
47 Ind. L.J. 419 (1972), interpreting Reed to stand for the proposition that If "a neutral
nonsexual alternative classification that would better accomplish the objective was readily
available" then Reed would mandate the statute's invalidation. Id. at 448.
104. See, e.g., LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1972) (No. 72-777) (invalidating mandatory
unpaid maternity leave for teachers five months pregnant); Bennett v. Dyer's Chop House,
41 U.S.L.W. 2243 (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 26, 1972) (invalidating restaurant rule excluding women
from 11:00 a.m. until 1:30 p.m.). But see Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 41
U.S.L.W. 2390 (4th Cir., Jan. 15, 1973) (en banc) (upholding mandatory unpaid maternity
leave for teachers five months pregnant), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3464 (U.S.
Feb. 15, 1973) (No. 72-1129).
105. This alone is no mean contribution in that "[tihe Court's influence . . . goes well
beyond the formal limits of its decrees. Its opinions are often the voice of the national con-
science. It shapes as well as expresses our national ideals." Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 91, 97 (1966) (footnote omitted).
106. Cf. A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962).
107. 405 U.S. at 446-47.
108. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 75-76 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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times in Supreme Court majority opinions. Of these cases, one was decided
under the strict review standard,10 9 one was Rinaldi v. Yeager," 0 another was
Morey v. Doud,'-" and the last was Allied Stores v. Bowers112 wherein Guano
was relied upon to illustrate the "point beyond which the State cannot go with-
out violating the Equal Protection Clause."'1 3 Additionally, it had become com-
mon practice for the Court to cite McGowan v. Maryland"4 and its extremely
permissive standard" 5 when reiterating the traditional equal protection formula.
A comparison of the salient features of the traditional standard as set forth
above with those of the test formulated in Guano and applied in Reed and
Eisenstadt, discloses three significant differences. First, Guano discusses the
standard which the purpose-classification relationship must meet in positive
terms. That is, rather than stating negatively that only the absence of a rational
relationship will suffice to invalidate a statute, Guano says that the classifica-
tion "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion .... ."16 This change of emphasis seems to indicate a shift in the burden
of proof from the shoulders of those attacking the statute, to those of the state
defending it. While most federal and state courts citing the Reed-Guano lan-
guage have not explicitly acknowledged that its application involves a shifting
of the burden of proof or in fact a new approach," 7 in Brenden v. Independent
School District 742,118 the court, in striking down a public high school rule which
prohibited girls from competing with or against boys in interscholastic athletics,
said that "[i]t is incumbent upon the defendants [the state] to show the
existence of a rational relationship between the objective sought to be achieved
by the rule and the classification utilized in reaching that objective."" 09
The second difference to be noted is that the Reed-Guano test requires that
the trait-classification relationship be a "fair and substantial" one, a standard
109. McLanghlin v. Florida, 379 US. 184, 191 (1964).
110. 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966); see text accompanying notes 33-34 supra, notes 167-71
infra.
111. 354 U.S. 457, 465; see text accompanying notes 81-85 supra.
112. 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).
113. Id.
114. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
115. See text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
116. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 US. 412, 415 (1920).
117. See, e.g., Kar v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972)
(upholding high school hair length regulation); Wilson v. Moore, 346 F. Supp. 635 (N.D.W.
Va. 1972) (upholding statute forbidding holding another government job while sitting in
the state legislature); Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.I. Ala.), prob. juris. noted,
41 U.S.L.W. 3183 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1972) (No. 71-1694) (upholding federal statute containing
presumption that married male servicemen had dependent wives, but requiring married
females to present actual proof of dependent husbands). But see cases cited at note 126 infra.
118. 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972). For an opposite holding on the issue of sexually
integrated athletics based upon a narrow interpretation of Reed, see Buchas v. Illinois
High School Ass'n, 41 U.S.L.W. 2277 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1972).
119. 342 F. Supp. at 1232-33. See also Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18, 20 (10th Cir. 1972).
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semantically more demanding than the mere rational relationship which satisfies
the traditional test. The First Circuit in Wark v. Robblins,120 while denying
the claim of a male convict that the imposition of a greater punishment upon
men escaping from a penitentiary than that imposed upon women escaping
from a reformatory violated the equal protection clause, noted that Reed
"arguably suggested" an "intermediate approach" somewhere in between the
relaxed traditional standard and rigorous strict scrutiny test.12 1 Although the
court said that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that in regard to escape
from markedly different penal institutions men and women were similarly
situated,2 2 it found the essence of Reed to be the requirement that there in
fact be "a substantial relation to a legitimate state objective."1 2
The third difference, and perhaps the most important one for those "rule
skeptics' 24 who follow the suggestion to "watch what we do, not what we say,"
is that the Court in Guano, Reed, Eisenstadt and four other cases decided dur-
ing the 1971 term, 2 5 as well as many lower courts, following120 these cases
have found the challenged statute to be unconstitutional. This "functional" or
"behavioral" observation, 127 plus analysis of the Court's language, leads to the
conclusion that a new equal protection test something in between the traditional
test and the strict scrutiny test has been devised. A fourth indicia of a new test
which is not found in the Guano-Reed language is the approach to the ascertain-
ment of legislative purpose utilized by Justice Brennan in his plurality opinion
in Eisenstadt v. Baird.
Baird, a well known advocate of birth control, 128 had been arrested following
120. 458 F.2d 1295 (1st Cir. 1972).
121. Id. at 1296-97 & n.4.
122. Id. at 1297. The basic distinction relied upon by the court was that the risk of
violence was greater for men escaping due to the tighter security at male institutions.
123. Id. at 1297 n.4.
124. See generally W. Rumble, American Legal Realism (1968).
125. See cases cited at note 87 supra.
126. These courts have cited Reed as a restatement of the traditional test, but have then
gone on to invalidate statutes which the traditional standard would in all liklihood have
condoned. See, e.g., LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1972) (No. 72-777) (invalidating mandatory
upaid maternity leave for teachers five months pregnant); Moreno v. Dep't of Agriculture,
345 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C.), prob. juris. noted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3312 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1972)
(No. 72-534) (invalidating a federal statute defining "household" to include only related
individuals for purposes of the food stamp program); Cooper v. Nix, 343 F. Supp. 1101
(W.D. La. 1972) (invalidating Louisiana State University housing regulation requiring all
students under 23 to live on campus).
127. The analysis of a case in terms of outcome (which party won and whichlost),
is useful in providing "a more realistic setting for examining the relevance of doctrinal
refinements." Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 Vand.
L. Rev. 479, 481 (1972).
128. Mr. Baird had previously been arrested in New York and convicted in New Jersey
in connection with displaying contraceptives. In State v. Baird, So N.J. 376, 235 A.2d 673
(1967), his conviction was overturned on narrow statutory grounds. For background on
Baird's earlier activities see Dienes, The Progeny of Comstockery-Birth Control Laws
Return to Court, 21 Am. U.L. Rev. 1, 45-47 (1971).
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a lecture he delivered at Boston University in 1967 during the course of which
he had exhibited various items used as means of contraception, and presented
a package of vaginal foam to a young woman in the audience. He was tried and
convicted in Massachusetts Superior Court for violating a statute- 9 which pro-
hibited the selling or giving away of instruments or articles intended to be used
for the prevention of conception, unless the individual receiving the device was
married and had a doctor's prescription. The United States Supreme Court, in
a 6 to 1 decision, 30 held that the purpose of the statute had neither been to
discourage premarital intercourse' 3' nor to protect the health needs of the
citizenry,132 but was "simply . . . a prohibition on contraception," on moral
groundsass and that as such it ran afoul of the strictures of the equal protection
clause in that "whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives
may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike?"'-
While this decision is sure to have an important impact on the concept of the
individual's right to privacy, it is only the equal protection element which
concerns us here.
Attempting to determine the legislative purpose of a challenged statute is an
undertaking that often "involves the Court in the thornier aspects of judicial
review."' 35 As Mr. Justice Brennan said of the statute in question in Baird:
"The legislative purposes that the statute is meant to serve are not altogether
clear."' 36 Under the traditional approach the Court usually presumed that the
legislature acted "constitutionally even if source materials normally resorted to
for ascertaining their grounds for action are otherwise silent.. ."7 and then
attributes "to the legislature any reasonably conceivable purpose which would
support the constitutionality of the classification."'13s Less frequently, the
129. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, §§ 21-21A (1970).
130. 405 U.S. at 439. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion in which
Justices Douglas, Stewart and Marshall joined. Justice Douglas concurred on first amend-
ment grounds; Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred on narrow statutory
grounds and alternatively on overbreadth as applied to married persons. Chief Justice
Burger dissented, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate. The division
within the Court raises doubts as to the precedential value of Eisenstadt.
131. See text accompanying notes 143-49 infra.
132. See text accompanying notes 150-54 infra.
133. 405 U.S. at 452.
134. Id. at 453.
135. Tussman & tenBroek 367. "[Tlhe search for purpose can become mere ascription
by the court of those legislative objectives which seem to assist a judgment already reached
upon other grounds." Coons, Clune & Sugarman 328. This manipulation of legislative
purpose is well documented in Note, Legislative Purpose, supra note 77, passim.
136. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US. 438, 442 (1972).
137. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). It has recently
been argued that: "It is always possible to define the legislative purpose of a statute in such
a way that the statutory classification is rationally related to it." Note, Legislative Purpose
128.
138. 1969 Developments-Equal Protection 1078 (footnote omitted) ; see, eg., McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528-29 (1959).
In Allied Stores the Court noted that it did not know the legislature's purpose in enacting
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Court would look more closely and attempt to isolate the purpose which ap-
peared most probable.13 o
In Eisenstadt, however, the Court's approach closely approximated the
search for legislative purpose utilized in a case where a statute's meaning is
at issue, thus requiring the Court to "try to divine the intended consequences
of a statute so as to be able faithfully to give rise to them."'140 The Court in
Eisenstadt indulged in none of the reaching out for any purpose that would
facilitate validation of the statute; rather, it probed rigorously, and skeptically
evaluated each purpose put forward by Massachusetts. In a sense, Eisenstadt
shifted the burden on the issue of purpose. More precisely, the Justices created
one and put it on the state rather than, as in the past, assuming it themselves.14 1
As the court said in Wark v. Robbins, "the state must do more than allow a
court to speculate .... 142
The first purpose proffered by the state in Eisenstadt was the discouragement
of premarital sexual intercourse.143 While conceding that a state could "regard
the problems of extramarital and premarital sexual relations as '[e]vils ...of
different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies . . .,' M44
Justice Brennan added that "we cannot agree that the deterrence of premarital
sex may reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the Massachusetts law."' 40
The rationale for this determination was not grounded on a finding of either
impermissible purpose, or the lack of a "fair and substantial relation" between
statutory purpose and objective; rather, the Court stated that it was "unreason-
able to assume" that the birth of an unwanted child was intended to serve as a
punishment for fornication14" and that in light of the ready availability of
contraceptive devices from without the state, the statute would not in reality
discourage fornication.147 Further, since fornication is punishable as a misde-
the statute, nor was this important in that there were many reasonable purposes which the
Court itself could conceive to justify the statute. Id. at 528-29.
139. 1969 Developments-Equal Protection 1078. Whichever approach the Court used
however, it would usually go to great lengths to state at least one valid purpose. In fact,
as one commentator has stated: "Classifications have been upheld by virtue of their relation
to goals it is clear the legislature had not thought of." Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1225 (1970) (footnote omitted). Re-
cently in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), and Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971),
the Court upheld statutes without making clear their purposes. The Supreme Court, 1970
Term, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 3, 126-27 & nn. 25-28 (1971).
140. Bickel, supra note 79, at 62.
141. See note 138 supra.
142. 458 F.2d 1295, 1297 n.4 (1st Cir. 1972).
143. 405 U.S. at 448. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts had relied upon this purpose
in upholding the statute at issue in Sturgis v. Attorney Gen., 358 Mass. 37, 260 N.E.2d 687,
690 (1970).
144. 405 U.S. at 448.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 448-49. The sections did not regulate the distribution of contraceptives to
be used for the prevention of disease. Thus the sale or giving away of a condom to an
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meanor, while violations of the statute here in question are felonies carrying
a sentence of up to five years in prison, the Court, adopting the language of
the First Circuit, said that it was "'hard to believe that the legislature adopted
a statute carrying a five-year penalty for its possible, obviously by no means fully
effective, deterrence of the commission of a ninety-day misdemeanor.' "148 The
Court thus refused to accept the deterrence of fornication as the statute's
purpose on the theory that, in reality, the statutory scheme could not accom-
plish that purpose with some undefined degree of efficacy, and that the use of
disparate jail sentences would impute to the Massachusetts legislature a theory
of penal deterrence which the Court "could not believe" the legislature would
choose.' 49
The second legislative objective asserted by the state was the protection of
public health. 50 The Court rejected this assertion, however, noting that the
available evidence suggested that it was actually the protection of morals,
rather than health, which had been intended, and further, that even if it were
in fact a health measure, "the statute would be both discriminatory and over-
broad."'151 It would be discriminatory in that the health needs of the unmarried
are at least as urgent as those of the married, 12 and its overbreadthea would
result from the fact that the statute required even married persons to obtain a
prescription for all contraceptives to be used for the prevention of pregnancy,
while the Court acknowledged that "not all contraceptives are potentially
dangerous'5
The Court, in what one judge has termed "a searching inquiry to determine
the actual purpose of the Massachusetts contraceptive legislation,"'vi thus
unmarried person would be legal whereas if the article were a diaphragm or birth control
pill, there would be a per se violation. CL Commonwealth v. Corbett, 307 lass. 7, 29 N.E2d
151 (1940).
148. 405 U.S. at 449, citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401 (1st Cir. 1970), alfd,
405 U.S. 438, 449 (1971).
149. See 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1525, 1527-28 (1971) for a critical analysis of the similar
reasoning that had been used by the Eisenstadt court of appeals.
150. See Dienes, supra note 128, at 88-93 for an extended discussion of the health
aspects.
151. 405 US. at 450.
152. The application of impermissible "under-inclusion" is very rare in traditional equal
protection cases. Tussman & tenBroek 348-50.
153. The use of the overbreadth doctrine in a traditional equal protection case is also
somewhat surprising in light of Justice Stewart's comments in Dandridge v. Williams to
the effect that overreaching should not be used to invalidate a state economic or social
regulation, but was only to be applied when a Bill of Rights freedom was impinged upon.
397 U.S. at 484-85; see Comment, Cash Deposits-Burdens and Barriers in Access to Utility
Services, 7 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 630, 641 (1972). While Dandridge probably
overstated the case in eschewing any use of overreaching (see Tussman & tenBroek 351-52)
its reappearance in Eisenstadt along with under-inclusion is another indication that a unique
equal protection test was being applied. Cf. 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1525, 1527 n.12 (1971).
154. 405 U.S. at 451 (footnote omitted).
155. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 811 n.18 (D. Conn.) (Newmn, J., concurring)
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analyzed and rejected the arguments that the challenged statutory scheme was
either a health measure or was intended to deter premarital intercourse. The
Court's approach to the problem of legislative purpose, its reliance upon the
Guano substantial relationship test and the concomitant shifting of the burden
of proof, as well as the finding that the proffered statutory purposes were un-
reasonable and overbroad, does not in any instance resemble the often articulated
methods of the traditional equal protection test. On the basis of the decisions
in Reed and Eisenstadt it must at the very least be said that to test a statute
by the traditional standard no longer guarantees its vindication. It seems pre-
ferable, however, to acknowledge, as the Court did not, that a new test some-
where in between the abdication of the traditional test and overt activism of
strict scrutiny is being employed.
V. A PROPOSED REiFORMULATION: Reed-Guano-Eisenstadt AND
REASONABLENESS OF IMPACT
Given the existence of a new equal protection test, a number of questions
present themselves: What are its contours? How will it be applied? And when
will the Court use it rather than the strict review or traditional tests?
One of the basic criticisms of the rational relationship requirement of the
traditional test was the Court's apparent inability to apply it with any degree
of consistency.' 56 To remedy this, it is suggested that in evaluating statutes
challenged under the equal protection clause the Court should search for what
Professor Dixon has termed "constitutional reasonableness," that is, "reason-
ableness of impact rather than strict logic or rational consistency in legislative
distinctions and classifications."'61 7 The question the Court considers is not
whether there is "internal consistency in classification systems," but rather if
the burden placed upon the group characterized by the trait is reasonable or
acceptable in light of the state's purpose in enacting the statute.1 8
Use of the above test unavoidably involves the Court in an examination of
legislative ends, but significantly, it does not require "a value laden" appraisal
of the legitimacy of ends.159 The distinction is far from spurious. Examination
of ends is a necessary and valuable component of all judicial decisions.' 00 The
days when judges could be said to find the law rather than make it are bygone.
It is now universally accepted that judges, and especially Supreme Court
Justices, do in fact make policy.16 With this in mind, it seems desirable to ask
that the Justices openly state and defend their policy preferences and considera-
tions of legislative ends. Only in this way can decisions resting on unarticulated
(emphasis added), appeal docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3298 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1972) (No. 72-730).
For a critical treatment see Note, Legislative Purpose 124-28.
156. See text accompanying notes 80-85 supra.
157. Dixon 158.
158. Id.
159. See Gunther 21, 23, 48.
160. See generally B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921).
161. Compare United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 62 (1936), with G. Schubert, Judicial
Policy-Making (1965).
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major premises be avoided. In addition, meaningful equal protection decisions
must concern themselves with ends due to the fact that equality is an entirely
relational concept which cannot be given any content without an examination
of both legislative ends and means.
Analysis of the decisions of the 1971 term suggest that the Court is in fact
using the concept of impact in conjunction with a sliding scale balance to evalu-
ate the reasonableness of a statute's classification in light of its purpose. The
"desirability" of the end, and the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing
it are being balanced against the impact or burden which the classification
imposes upon the members of the named class. As the desirability of attaining
the end rises, and the burden decreases, the more willing the Court has been to
accept patently under and over inclusive classifications. On the other hand,
the greater the impact and the less desirable and capable of accomplishment
the end, the less over and under inclusion the Court will tolerate.
Use of the impact test involves the Court in four interconnected inquiries:
(1) What is the classificatory trait? (2) What is the statutory purpose?
(3) What is the nature and extent of the burden or impact of the statute upon
the members of the class? and (4) What is the relationship of the classification
to the purpose? Under the traditional test, the state was under no obligation to
answer any of the above-mentioned questions, and the Court itself usually dealt
with the first and second, while the challenger had the burden of establishing
the irrationality of the classification under the fourth. While the statute's
impact was never explicitly discussed by the Court, it began in the 1960's to
serve as the unstated basis of the decision.'
0 2
It is suggested that the four decisions' 0 3 of the Warren Court which invali-
dated state social legislation on equal protection grounds without relying
explicitly upon either the traditional or active review standard, can be explained
as examples of the Court's unacknowledged but very real use of reasonableness
of impact as an equal protection test, and thus were forerunners of the new
approach. In Baxstrom v. Herold,'-1 the Court invalidated a New York "statutory
procedure under which a person [could] be civilly committed at the expiration
of his penal sentence without the jury review available to all other persons
civilly committed in New York.' 5 The Court found that in terms of deciding
"whether a person is mentally ill and in need of institutionalization, there is no
conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing
the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments." 1001 The key to this
decision was that the heavy burden that civil commitment placed upon the
members of the class led the Court to require that the state come forward and
justify the statutory classification. When it failed to do so, the Court refused
to undertake the task on its own, and invalidated the statute.
162. See text accompanying notes 163-76 infra.
163. See note 33 supra.
164. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
165. Id. at 110.
166. Id. at 111-12.
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Rinaldi v. Yeager'67 presented an even clearer example of the Court's use of
the impact criteria. In Rinaldi the Court invalidated a New Jersey statute which
required that indigent defendants confined to penal institutions repay the state
for the cost of their transcript on appeal. The statute did not provide, however,
that those defendants who received suspended sentences, were placed on proba-
tion or were sentenced to pay a fine be similarly obligated to repay the state.
Thus, among all defendants whose convictions were affirmed on appeal, only
those who were sent to prison had to repay the state for the cost of their
transcripts.1 8 In overturning this statute, the Court recognized that "legislation
may impose special burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible
ends."'169 But, the Court, quoting Baxstrom v. Hterold, also recognized that in
defining a class, the distinctions drawn must have "'some relevance to the
purpose for which the classification is made."' 170 On the question of why the
state chose to burden only those defendants who were incarcerated, the Court
noted that it had "been referred to no record of legislative history"' 1' which
would explain the classifications justification and that it could think of none
itself.
.The final two examples of the pre-1971 use of the impact test are found in
the companion cases of Levy v. Louisiana17 2 and Glona v. American Guarantee &
Liability Insurance Co.17 3 In these decisions, the Court invalidated Louisiana
statutes which respectively barred an illegitimate child from recovering for the
wrongful death of his or her mother, and barred the mother from recovering
for the wrongful death of an illegitimate child. In Levy, Justice Douglas noted
the existence of the two-tiered equal protection approach and then stated: "The
rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial relationship between a child
and his own mother."' 7 4 This indicates that the impact of the statute was viewed
as impinging upon a right which derived from an important relationship, but
one which was not fundamental. With this background, and without further
discussion of the appropriate standard to be applied, the Court held that illegit-
imacy was an irrational classificatory trait in regards to compensating children
for damages suffered due to the wrongful death of their mother.'17 This decision
can be viewed as an inarticulate use of the impact test by a Court which, in 1968,
was already feeling constrained by the rigidity of the two-tiered approach.'7 0
167. 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
168. Id. at 307-08.
169. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
170. Id. quoting Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111. The Court also cited Guano
as authority for the statement.
171. 384 U.S. at 309.
172. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
173. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). For a critical analysis of the Court's rationale in these cases
see Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions on
Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 338 (1969).
174. 391 U.S. at 71.
175. Id. at 72.
176. See text accompanying notes 63-76 supra. In Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971),
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Analysis of the decisions of the 1971 term sheds further light on the Court's
use of a new test.
In James v. Strange,177 the Court found that the purpose of the statute was
to recoup funds expended for the legal defense of indigent defendants in criminal
actions, and that the classification was all indigent criminal defendants, as
opposed to other judgment debtors. 7 8 The burden on the members of the class
was-that the criminal defendants owing money to the state were not comparably
protected against garnishment, nor were the usual exemptions provided other
judgment debtors available to them. 79 The Court made much of the" 'tremendous
hardships'" which the statute worked upon the debtor.1'
As to the purpose-classification relationship, the Court noted the "legitimate
state interests" in recoupment, but found no justification for the imposition of
"unduly harsh or discriminatory terms merely because the obligation is to the
public treasury rather than to a private creditor."11 8 ' It is difficult to conclude
whether the state failed to show that there was a relationship between purpose
and classification, or if the challenger had proven that the relationship was
irrational or unreasonable in light of the burden. The Court had recognized that
"enforcement procedures with respect to judgments need not be identical,"' 8'-
but found the burden in this scheme to be too heavy and the differences be-
tween the classes and the effectiveness of the statute not commensurately great.
Strange relied in part upon Rinaldi v. Yeager,'1 one of the rare Warren Court
equal protection invalidations which failed to explain which test it was employ-
ing. Like Rinaldi, Strange approaches the indigent defendant cases such as
Griffin v. Illinoises and the area of fundamental rights, for as the Court said
in Strange, "to impose these harsh conditions on a class of debtors who were
provided counsel as required by the Constitution is to practice, no less than in
Rinaldi, a discrimination which the Equal Protection Clause proscribes. ' a
Thus the Court found that the burden of the statute upon indigent defendants
was unreasonable in light of the obvious and unexplained underinclusion of the
statutory classification. Had the burden been less, or fallen upon a class in a
better position to bear it, then the Court would probably have been more willing
to permit the legislature to deal with the problem as it saw fit.
The decision in Jackson v. Indiana8 0 invalidated a statute which, in effect,
the Court retreated from Levy and Glona and upheld a Louisiana statute which barred
illegitimate children from sharing in the estate of an intestate parent. But see text accom-
panying notes 192-96, 235-38 infra.
177. 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
178. Id. at 129-31.
179. Id. at 135-37.
180. Id. at 136, quoting Snaidich v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
181. 407 U.S. at 138.
182. Id. (footnote omitted).
183. See text accompanying notes 167-71 supra.
184. 351 US. 12 (1956).
185. 407 US. at 140-41.
186. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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often resulted in the lifetime commitment of a criminal defendant upon a show-
ing that he was incompetent to stand trial.187 The standards for such commit-
ment, and the procedural safeguards afforded the defendant prior to commitment
were substantially lower than those which applied to civil commitment proceed-
ings, while the standards for release were higher.L88 Relying on its decision in
Baxstrorn v. Herold,8 9 the Court said that "the mere filing of criminal charges
surely cannot suffice" to "justify less procedural and substantive protection
against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others .... "100
The Court thus determined that the problem of dealing with criminal defendants
who are incompetent to stand trial could not be solved by committing them
indefinitely under standards and procedures inferior to those offered civil com-
mittees. The Court did say, however, that were the commitment "only tem-
porary" it might be permissible to use standards different from those required
in civil commitment proceedings.191 This decision can be read as an example
of the Court balancing the impact of the statute against its purposes. It is ap-
parent that something must be done with incompetent defendants, and if what
is done does not impose too heavy a burden on the defendant, the Court might
allow procedures different from those followed in civil commitment proceedings.
When, however, the burden is indefinite commitment with a substantial possi-
bility of its being permanent, the Court will not permit different treatment
without a greater showing by the state that criminal defendants are dissimilarly
situated than all others facing long term commitment. Another way of stating
this rationale is to say that while criminal defendants alleged to be incompetent
to stand trial are in fact dissimilar to individuals who are the subjects of civil
commitment proceedings, they are not dissimilar enough to justify the imposition
of so heavy a burden.
Whereas Reed and Eisenstadt seemed to revitalize the traditional test, Weber
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.192 totally ignored the two-tiered approach. As
Professor Gunther noted, Justice Powell's opinion "tried to blur the distinctions
between strict and minimal scrutiny precedents by formulating an overarching
inquiry applicable to 'all' equal protection cases."' 93 In fact, the Court's state-
ment of the "essential inquiry" contains elements of the impact test discussed
above. As Justice Powell stated it, the Court must always ask "[w] hat legitimate
state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights
might the classification endanger?"' 94 In Weber, the challenged statute put un-
acknowledged illegitimate children in the position of receiving workmen's com-
pensation benefits only if their parents' legitimate children did not first exhaust
187. Id. at 720-23.
188. Id. at 728-30.
189. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). See text accompanying notes 164-66 supra.
190. 406 U.S. at 724.
191. Id. at 725.
192. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
193. Gunther 17.
194. 406 U.S. at 173.
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the available funds.195 In striking down the statute, the Court explicitly ac-
knowledged that there is an equal protection middle ground between the tra-
ditional and strict standards. "Though the latitude given state economic and
social regulation is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications
approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a
stricter scrutiny." 19s6 Thus, Justice Powell was saying that there are certain
non-fundamental rights which deserve stricter scrutiny than that available under
the traditional standard. That is, of course, the essence of the burden test, in
that it recognizes that as the impact of the statute becomes more detrimental
to the members of the class, the scrutiny required becomes more intense.
As has been noted, there were four equal protection cases decided during the
1971 term in which the Court upheld the statute in question 1 7 Two of these
decisions contain elements of the new approach, while the other two offer a
clue as to those areas in which the Court will continue to use the traditional
test rather than the impact balancing test. Another valuable aspect of these four
cases is that they were not unanimous decisions. While the unanimity of the
invalidations is evidence that the "trend had remarkably widespread support
on the Court,"198 the study of a non-unanimous decision can, as Herman
Pritchett demonstrated, "supply information about [the Justices'] attitudes
and their values which is available in no other way.... [D]isagreement dem-
onstrates that the members of the Court are operating on different assumptions,
that their inarticulate major premises are dissimilar, that their value systems
are differently constructed and weighted ....
The most revealing of the non-unanimous decisions, which found the majority
voting to uphold the challenged statute, was Schilb v. Kuebel.2 0° Contrary to
Professor Gunther's assertion, in Schilb, as well as in Lind*ey v. Normet,201
the Court's decisional process was far more than a finding of "minimal ratio-
nality after merely a perfunctory, deferential judicial examination." 2 02 Schilb,
a 4 to 3203 decision, upheld a statute which required a defendant to put up 10
per cent of his bail as security, and had the clerk retain 10 per cent of the se-
curity as bail costs. Defendants released in their own recognizance were, of
course, not subject to the loss of 10 per cent of the deposit, and neither were
those who put up the full amount in cash.2 04 The purpose of the statute was
195. Id. at 167-68.
196. Id. at 172 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
197. See note 88 supra.
198. Gunther 19.
199. C.L Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values
1937-1947 XII (1948).
200. 404 US. 357 (1971).
201. 405 US. 56 (1972).
202. Gunther 25.
203. Mr. justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White and Marshall joined. Justice Douglas dissented alone, and
Justice Stewart wrote a dissent in which Justice Brennan joined.
204. 404 US. at 367.
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found by the majority to be the reform of the bail system and an attempt to
"rectify [the] offensive situation" concerning bail bondsmen.20 5 To illustrate
the purpose and operation of the statute, the Court quoted extensively from the
legislative committee report.20 While there was never any actual discussion
of the issue of reasonable relationship, the Court concluded by saying: "[xw]e
refrain from nullifying this Illinois statute that . . . has brought reform and
needed relief to the State's bail system. '20 7 Thus, the Court saw a valid and im-
portant state purpose; it had been convinced of its successful accomplishment,
and in light of the small burden produced by the under-inclusion, the statute
was upheld. justice Marshall's concurring opinion voiced a similar rationale:
"In the evolving struggle for meaningful bail reform I cannot find the present
Illinois move toward that objective to be unconstitutional. '208 Thus, all the
members of the Court who voted to uphold the statute saw its purpose to be
bail reform, and, in light of this laudable end which the statute appeared to
be accomplishing, they were willing to tolerate a certain degree of unjustified
inequality. The dissenters, on the other hand, did not see the purpose as broadly.
Rather, they argued that it was merely an attempt to cover administrative costs
and that this purpose did not justify "selective imposition" of cost upon one
class of defendants2 9 The case, then, turned upon the identification of the
statutory purpose. Both factions of the'Court agreed that there was a burden,
and that it was not really oppressive. In light of this, the purpose posited by
the majority outweighed the burden imposed; that purpose upon which the
dissenters relied, did not.
A second case in which the Court upheld the statute was Lindsey v. Nor-
met.210 There, an Oregon law provided for a trial within six days of the service
of the complaint in real property possessory actions.2 11 The Court found the
purpose of the statute to be the "prompt as well as peaceful resolution of
disputes oVer 'the right to possession of real property' 212 and it found the
provision for an early trial to be "closely related to that purpose. '215 The im.
position of the burden of a quick court appearance was held to be permissible
due to the "unique factual and legal characteristics of the landlord-tenant
relationship that justify special statutory treatment inapplicable to other liti-
gants."2 14 Here, then, the state came forward with convincing evidence that
there was a reasonable relationship between the purpose and the classification
by showing that possessory disputes between landlords and tenants were, in
205. 404 U.S. at 360.
206. Id. at 363 n.8.
207. Id. at 372.
208. Id. at 373.
209. Id. at 384 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
210. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
211. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 105.135-.140 (1971).
212. 405 U.S. at 70.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 72.
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fact, dissimilar to other legal disputes. Thus, the Court found that although the
statute did burden defendants, such a burden was entirely justifiable.
The final two cases in which the Court upheld statutes against equal protec-
tion challenges involved payments of benefits under the Social Security and Aid
to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") programs. In Jefferson v.
Hackney,215 the Court held that the State of Texas could use a percentage
reduction factor in determining the amount of funds to be allocated to its various
aid programs, notwithstanding the fact that it resulted in lower payments to
AFDC recipients than to recipients of Aid for the Permanently and Totally
Disabled, Old Age Assistance, or Aid to the Blind.210 After quickly disposing
of allegations of racial motivation,217 the Court used the traditional approach. It
did not require the state to come forward with evidence of its actual purpose
or purposes as it had in Eisenstadt, but rather accepted "suggestions"2 18 as to
possible purposes, and then added a number of alternative purposes which the
state "may" have had in mind.2 19
The decision in Richardson v. Belcher'20 took much the same approach.
There, the Court upheld an "offset" provision of the Social Security Act which
reduced federal benefits for those disabled workers who were also covered by
state workmen's compensation programs.2' The statute limited the maximum
combined state and federal payments to eighty per cent of the employee's aver-
age earnings. The asserted purpose of this provision was to eliminate those situa-
tions in which an employee would be receiving benefits totaling more than his
usual salary, thereby reducing his incentive to return to work 222 This Con-
gressional enactment was alleged to be a violation of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment in that it did not provide for reducing payments to those
individuals who were receiving private insurance benefits in addition to those
coming from the federal government.2= The Court upheld the statute without
meeting the dissenters' argument 24 that there was no distinction in terms of
legislative purpose between individuals receiving state workmen's compensation
and those receiving private insurance benefits. Notwithstanding this failure of
the government 225 and the Court to justify the statute's under-inclusion, the
statute was not struck down. The Court relied upon Dandridge v. Williams,2 0
and stated that "[a] statutory classification in the area of social welfare is con-
215. 406 US. 535 (1972).
216. Id. at 549.
217. Id. at 548-49.
218. See Brief for Appellee at 17, Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
219. 406 US. at 549.
220. 404 US. 78 (1971).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 424a(a) (1970).
222. 404 U.S. at 83; see Brief for Appellant at 9-11, Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971).
223. 404 US. at 81.
224. Id. at 92-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
225. See Brief for Appellant at 9-11, 15, Richardson v. Belcher, 404 US. 78 (1971).
226. 397 US. 471 (1970).
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sistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is
'rationally based and free from invidious discrimination.' ,,27 The reiteration of
the Dandridge language indicates that the Court will be reluctant to apply the
new equal protection test in cases involving welfare and social security. The
reason for this might derive from the recognition that this is a technical and
complex area and the conclusion that the Court lacks the institutional com-
petence to deal with it effectively and should, therefore, defer to the judgment
of the legislature.228 If, in fact, a majority of the Justices do agree with those
who, like Len Fuller, caution against the overjudicialization of "every function
of government" in the belief that "adjudication is an ineffective instrument for
economic management and for governmental participation in the allocation of
economic resources,"'229 then until those challenging distributive social legisla-
tion can demonstrate otherwise, these statutes will be tested under the traditional
standard regardless of either the burden or the extent of under and over-inclu-
sion.
Having analyzed the equal protection decisions of the 1971 term, it seems
clear that the Court no longer feels bound by the two-tiered equal protection
test. It is also apparent, however, that the contours of the new approach are
far from settled. In fact, as the initial decisions of the 1972 term demonstrate,
equal protection adjudication is undergoing a reformulation, the exact nature of
which may not emerge for a number of years.
The first equal protection decision of the 1972 term quite clearly follows the
traditional test. In United States v. Kras,230 the Court held that the mandatory
payment of a filing fee for those seeking a discharge in bankruptcy did not vio-
late either the due process or equal protection clause. The majority opinion
distinguished Boddie v. Connecticut23l on the ground that requiring a filing fee
to obtain a divorce resulted in a denial of access to the courts in regard to a
fundamental relationship, while a discharge in bankruptcy "although important
...does not rise to the same constitutional level."28 2 The Court stated: "If
Kras is not discharged in bankruptcy, his position will not be materially altered
in any constitutional sense." 233 Thus, no fundamental interests were found to
be at stake, and bankruptcy legislation, being "in the area of economics and
social welfare," the traditional test with its requirement of a "rational justifi-
cation" was applied. 23 4 While use of the Reed-Guano-impact test might not
227. 404 U.S. at 81, quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 487. As one com-
mentator said of the Dandridge decision: "[Tlhis looks like an unmistakable message to
welfare groups and their lawyers to look elsewhere for legal relief." Reinstein, supra note
100, at 50.
228. See Gunther 23-24.
229. L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 176 (rev. ed. 1969); see A. Miller, The Supreme
Court and American Capitalism 198-202 (1968); cf. A. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the
Idea of Progress 175-81 (1970).
230. 41 U.S.L.W. 4117 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1973).
231. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
232. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4121.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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have changed the outcome in Kras, the Court's reference to a "constitutional"
level is antithetical to the thesis herein presented in that it fails to recognize
the very harsh negative impact that deprivation of some non-constitutional
rights and interests can have. While the decision in Kras could be interpreted
as a sign that the Court is returning to the strictures of the two-tiered approach,
the recent per curiam opinion in Gomez v. Perez2i suggests otherwise. In Gomez,
the Court, relying on its decisions in Levy v. Louisiana and Weber v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co., held that Texas could not "grant legitimate children a judi-
cially enforceable right to support from their natural fathers and at the same
time deny that right to illegitimate children."230 The Court, without stating
which equal protection test was appropriate, gave Levy and Weber an expansive
interpretation.
Under these decisions, a State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate
children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally. We therefor
hold that once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to
needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justifi-
cation for denying such an essential right to a child simply because her natural father
has not married her mother.237
Although Gomez comes dose to declaring illegitimacy to be a suspect classifica-
tion, the Court, as in Reed,23s did not find it necessary to take this step. Thus,
it appears that if a state wishes to treat illegitimate children differently from
legitimate children, it will have to convince the Court that they are dissimilar
in a way which justifies the disparate treatment.
In terms of the reasonableness of impact test, the Gomez decision is signifi-
cant in that the Court described support as an "essential right." In contrast
to the approach taken in Kras, the Court did not feel constrained to speak of a
"constitutional level" but recognized that even though support is not a funda-
mental right protected by the Constitution, depriving a young child of parental
support is a harsh burden requiring substantial justification.
In light of Gormez, and the trend evident from the Court's decisions in the
1971 term, it may be prudent to withhold judgment on the ultimate doctrinal
significance of Kras. Whether in retrospect Kras will be seen as a return to the
two-tiered approach, an attempt to insure that the Boddie rationale will not be
extended, or the final appearance of the old approach, only future decisions
of the Court will reveal.
VI. A PREMUNARY JUSTIFIcATION OF THE
USE OF THE NEw TEST
The three key elements which run through the cases discussed above are the
shifting burden of coming forward with the statutory purpose, the shifting bur-
den of proof on the reasonableness of the classification, and the use of impact
or burden as a criterion for determining permissible degrees of unequal treat-
235. 41 U.S.L.W. 4174 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1973).
236. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4174; see text accompanying notes 172-76, 192-96 supra.
237. 41 US.L.W. at 4175.
238. See text accompanying notes 102-06 supra.
19731
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ment. This last element will, in all probability, cause the most debate and
generate the greatest criticism. This is so because it involves the Court in the
weighing or ranking of values which have no specific constitutional content
or textual origin. In anticipation, the following tentative justification for the
use of the impact test is offered.
Professor Goodpaster has persuasively argued that in applying the equal pro-
tection clause, courts have always concerned themselves with "due process kinds
of considerations" such as "improper" governmental action and "unfairness." 230
The intersection of the two clauses is apparent in cases of indigent defendants
in the appellate process such as Griffin v. llinois240 and Douglas v. California,24i
where the Court found denials of equal protection due to the unfairness of
conditioning ability to file an appeal and the right to be represented by counsel
in that appeal upon considerations of wealth. As one analysis of Douglas' equal
protection rationale put it, "[t]hat this is not logically equal protection does
not detract from the fact that it is practically due process. ' 242 More recently in
Boddie v. Connecticut,243 Justice Harlan's plurality opinion described the inter-
action of the two clauses from the opposite point of view and found that requir-
ing indigents to pay a filing fee in a divorce action violated the due process right
to "be afforded an opportunity to go into court to obtain a divorce ....,,244
Thus, as Professor Goodpaster noted, the two concepts have a "symbolic rela-
tionship" and "overlap like propositions in Venn diagrams in Aristotelian logic
.... ,"245 This being the case, it seems fair to analogize the equal protection
question of which test the Court should use in evaluating a challenged statute
to the due process determination of which procedural safeguards are proper in a
given situation.246 As Chief Justice Burger said in Morrissey v. Brewer,2 47 where
the Court held that there must be "an effective but informal hearing" 248 prior to
revocation of parole, "[o]nce it is determined that due process applies, the ques-
tion remains what process is due." 249 To paraphrase, once it is determined that
equal protection applies, the question remains what protection is equal. That is,
how equal must the protection be to satisfy the constitutional mandate? This
of course depends upon which test is utilized and how; this in turn depends,
for the most part, upon the "nature of the interest" that the classification af-
fects. If the interest is one previously recognized as fundamental, then active
review is triggered and the state must demonstrate a compelling interest. If on
the other hand, the interest is not one denominated fundamental, the issue is
239. Goodpaster 243. Much of the discussion which follows borrows from and builds
upon Goodpaster's analysis.
240. 351 US. 12 (1956).
241. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
242. Gerard, The Right to Counsel on Appeal in Missouri, 1965 Wash. U.L.Q. 463, 481.
243. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
244. Id. at 382.
245. Goodpaster 243.
246. A similar suggestion was made by Reinstein, supra note 100, at 46-49.
247. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
248. Id. at 485.
249. Id. at 481.
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whether to use the traditional or the Reed-Guano test. It is suggested that this
determination is somewhat analogous to the determination made under the due
process clause regarding the formality of the required hearing. In both Mor-
rissey v. Brewer and Fuentes v. Shevin,-" where it was held that due process
requires some form of hearing prior to pre-judgment repossession of personal
property, the Court faced the problem of determining the nature of the hearing
to be held. In Morrissey, the Court, acting as it had in Goldberg v. Kdly,ml
set very specific guidelines by which to conduct "an effective but informal"
parole revocation hearing.252 In Fuentes, however, the Court declined the invita-
tion to set forth a code of procedure, stating that the nature and form of the
hearing "are legitimately open to many potential variations and are a subject,
at this point, for legislation-not adjudication."25 3 In essence, as the Court said
in Boddie v. Connecticut, "[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the
hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and
the nature of the subsequent proceedings."2 54
The point is that if the Court acknowledges that different interests require
different degrees of protection under the due process clause, why can it not do
the same under the equal protection clause? It is thus submitted that the Court's
consideration and grading of non-constitutional interests in equal protection
cases should not be viewed as either aberrant or unusual, but rather as the
logical and beneficial application of principles recently enunciated in proce-
dural due process cases. Such an approach provides the Court with a much
needed tool for protecting a variety of non-constitutional interests without re-
quiring the expansion of the list of fundamental interests to the point that there
are more inclusions than exclusions. More importantly, the reasonableness of
impact test discussed above is not a proposal for a new approach, rather, it is
a description of the reality of Supreme Court decision making in equal protec-
tion cases. As such, its use should greatly facilitate the open consideration of
factors which have always been implicit in those decisions, and as Charles Black
has said, "clarity about what we are doing, about the true or the truly accept-
able grounds of judgment, is both a good in itself, and a means to a sounder
decision."2 5
VII. A CRiTICAL ANALySIS OF PROFESSOR GUNTHER'S
"NEw" EQUAL PROTEcTION TEST
In the Foreword to the Harvard Law Review's annual analysis of the Supreme
Court, Professor Gerald Gunther has presented his view of the causes for, and
250. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
251. 397 US. 254 (1970) (requiring a hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits).
252. 408 U.S. at 484-89, accord, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
253. 407 U.S. at 96-97 (footnote omitted).
254. 401 U.S. at 378 (footnote omitted). In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 US. 564
(1972), the Court said, "a weighing process has long been a part of any determination of
the form of hearing required in particular situations by procedural due process?' Id. at 570
(emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
255. C. Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 32 (1969).
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contours of, the new equal protection test. Gunther's essay, entitled "In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Pro-
tection, '256 rests upon three premises with which this Comment is in full accord:
(1) the Burger Court will be slow to create new suspect classifications or funda-
mental interests; (2) there is growing displeasure with the rigidity of the two-
tiered approach; (3) the Court is ready to use a test somewhere in between
strict scrutiny and the traditional approach.257 It is with Gunther's formulation
of the outlines and application of the test that issue is here taken. In his essay,
the new test is described as "a means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred
ground of decision in a broad range of cases. 258 The model is said to require
"that legislative means must substantially further legislative ends. 259 "It would
have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that have sub-
stantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture." Thus, "[i] t would concern
itself solely with means, not with ends.... The yardstick for the acceptability
of the means would be the purposes chosen by the legislatures, not 'constitu-
tional' interests drawn from the value perceptions of the Justices.
". .. [The new test] would permit the state to select any means that sub-
stantially furthered the legislative purpose.1 20 0 As must be evident, the key word
in the test is "means," and yet nowhere is it defined. It seems, in light of the
uses of "means" in the above, to be capable of two alternative definitions. One
is that "[a] legislative, or administrative, means is a classification of persons
upon whom the law will operate." 20 ' Ends, on the other hand, are the legislative
purposes or goals. However, if this definition is accepted, how can the observa-
tion that the state may "select any means that substantially further[s] the legis-
lative purpose" 2 2 be understood? It seems doubtful that Gunther would suggest
that a statute which automatically preferred tall people to short ones as estate
administrators would be valid, notwithstanding the fact that it furthered the
legislative end of reducing administrative disputes. Yet, in analyzing Reed v.
Reed, Gunther states that the decision does not conform to his model in that
"[c]lear priority classifications are plainly relevant to the State's interest in re-
ducing administrative disputes. Even if the requirement be that the means bear
a 'significant relationship' to the state's purpose, or contribute substantially to
its achievement, the test would seem to have been met in Reed."208 The con-
fusion appears to derive from using "priority classificatizn" rather than "men
instead of women" as the statement of the legislative classification. To say that
priority classifications bear a rational relationship to the diminution of court
256. Gunther, supra note 37.
257. Id. at 12-20.
258. Id. at 20.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 21.
261. Coons, Clune & Sugarman 321 (emphasis added).
262. Gunther 21.
263. Id. at 34 (footnotes omitted). A similar appraisal of Reed was offered in Note, Legis-
lative Purpose 150-51. The critique of Gunther's formulation which follows is equally
applicable to the Note.
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disputes over who should be the administrator is all well and good. To say,
however, that automatically favoring men over equally qualified women is a
rational priority classification, is exactly what the Court refused to do in that
such discrimination makes "the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice for-
bidden by the Equal Protection Clause .... M04
This leads to the second, and it is suggested more probable, definition that
Gunther had in mind. Means are not synonymous with classification, rather
the term stands for the method by which the classification will lead to the effec-
tuation of the end chosen by the legislature. If this is in fact a proper definition
of "means," then Gunther is opting for an equal protection test in which "the
rationality of a distinction is to be measured against what the legislature or
other decision maker was trying to accomplish. But were this in fact the Court's
approach, the equal protection dause---save in cases of out and out lunacy-
would, again, outlaw only legislation enacted in pursuit of some universally
unacceptable goal..." 265 or when the goal is unarticulated and the Court re-
fuses to supply it. Gunther is thus not calling for a rational relationship between
the purpose and the classification, but only for an efficacious one between the
purpose and the "means" that the legislature has chosen to accomplish that
purpose.
The basic failure of Gunther's analysis is that it ignores the equal protection
command of similar treatment for those similarly situated and concentrates in-
stead upon the reasonableness of the legislature's choice of method. Such an
approach would be more appropriately applied in an attempt to revitalize due
process as a limited substantive check on state legislation. As regards equal
protection, however, it is unacceptable. While the equal protection and due pro-
cess clauses are in many respects overlapping and practically identical, they
do have significant differences. Foremost among these is that equal protection
quite aptly deals with equality, while due process deals with fairness. The fact
that strands of each exist within the other does not indicate that one or the
other is superfluous. Gunther, however, has redefined equal protection in due
process terms, and by so doing has neglected the equal protection stricture of
similar treatment for those similarly situated.
Analysis of the seven cases which Gunther declares to be "the best evidence"
of the "reality" of his model raises further doubts as to its viability. Of the
seven, Gunther himself puts aside Stanley v. Illinois2O "at the outset" as resting
on due process rather than equal protection grounds 0 7 Reed v. Reed and Eisen-
stadt v. Baird respectively throw the model "into doubt '2' 08 and "undercut [it]
in a fundamental way."1269 Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. -20 is never
264. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
265. Ely, supra note 139, at 1225 (footnote omitted).
266. 405 US. 645 (1972).
267. Gunther 25.
268. Id. at 34 (footnotes omitted).
269. See id. at 35.
270. 406 US. 164 (1972).
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evaluated in terms of the model, 271 and Humphrey v. Cady272 is given minimal
scrutiny at best.273 Thus it is only Jackson v. Indiana274 and James v. Strang275
which remain. As to Jackson, Gunther again fails to explain the method by
which the Court is to analyze the means-end relationship, It is said that ',legis-
lative methods" are to be measured 'fagainst the ends defined by the legislature"
and not constitutional principles,270 but there is no clue as to how the measuring
should be done. Finally, Strange is said to be "illustrative of the cases in which
the intensity of scrutiny most dearly conformed to the model.1277 In Strange,
however, wherein the Court invalidated a recoupment statute which stripped
indigent criminal defendants who had been represented by state compensated
attorneys of much of the protection against excessive garnishment afforded
other judgment debtors, the decision was said to rest upon the lack of an "ar-
ticulated state ground for the difference .... ,,278 The Court's refusal in this
case to supply one on its own is surely an example of the shift in the burden
of coming forward and explaining the basis for treating the members of the
class differently from all others.2 79 At the same time, however, the decision does
not enlighten us as to the use of "intensified means scrutiny" when there is, as
there will be in most cases, some articulated reason for the difference in the
treatment. If one takes the approach Gunther used in his analysis of Reed
and applies it to Strange, the reasoning would be as follows: if the statutory
purpose was to assure that the state was reimbursed by criminal defendants
who were capable of making such repayment, then there was definitely a ra-
tional relationship between the burdensome repayment requirements (the means)
and the legislative end. If, however) one concentrates on the classification rather
than the method, the issue becomes why criminal defendants are to be treated
differently from other judgment debtors, and the reasonableness of the classifi-
cation in light of the burden becomes difficult to demonstrate.
Gunther's emphasis on legislative "means," rather than on similar treatment
for those similarly situated, apparently derives from a desire to see the Court
use the equal protection clause as an effective check on legislation without at
the same time having to render an overabundance of decisions based upon
"'constitutional' interests drawn from the value perceptions of the Justices."'2 80
Understandably, both the Court and Gunther would like to formulate the new
equal protection test so as to avoid the appearance of having resurrected sub-
stantive due process. As a result, both seem to have overstated the judicial
restraint elements of the new approach. Gunther, for example, in describing
271. Gunther 27-28.
272. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
273. Gunther 30-32.
274. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
275. 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
276. Gunther 28.
277. Id. at 33.
278. Id. at 28, 33.
279. See text accompanying notes 177-85 supra.
280. Gunther 21.
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the decisional process of Jackson v. Indiana281 as one in which the Court mea-
sured "the legislative methods against the ends defined by the legislature, not
in terms of constitutionally compelled limits on legislative purposes,"-6- sounds
surprisingly reminiscent of Justice Roberts' 1935 pronouncement in United
States v. BxtlerF8 that the Court "has only one duty,-to lay the article of the
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to de-
cide whether the latter squares with the former."2"
As for the Court, while the equal protection decisions of the 1971 term did
successfully avoid resting upon "ultimate" constitutional interests, 85 they did
not and could not avoid the sometimes less than ultimate but never less than
real value perceptions of the Justices themselves. Whether the issue was the
importance of bail reform,280 the burden of indefinite commitment in a mental
institution,28 7 or the role of the Court in reviewing distributive social welfare
programs,28 8 the decisions rested, in Professor Frankfurter's phrase, upon the
"controlling conceptions" of the Justices.2 89 To describe the new equal protec-
tion approach in a manner which suggests that its application is neutral and
valueless is to ignore its reality in an attempt to objectify the work of the Court.
At the same time, it is true that "reasonableness" was the basic criterion of
substantive due process, and it cannot be denied that there is more than a surface
similarity between the reasonableness of impact test and substantive due pro-
process.& 0 To admit this, however, neither negates the reality of its existence
nor voids its utility. In contrast to the manner in which substantive due process
was used to strike down economic regulations in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the equal protection approach described above should not
lead to decisions based upon "inarticulate major premises."2' 1 Reasonableness
of impact as a method for determining permissible degrees of under and over-
inclusion, as well as which party must bear the burden of proof, is a tentative
operational description of the manner in which equal protection decisions are
in fact reached. As such, its use will require the Justices to admit that they
281. 406 U.S. 715 (1972); see text accompanying notes 186-91 supra.
282. Gunther 28.
283. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
284. Id. at 62.
285. Gunther 28.
286. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971); see text accompanying notes 200-09 supra.
287. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); see text accompanying notes 186-91 supra.
288. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971); see text accompanying notes 215-29 supra.
289. Frankfurter, supra note 1, at 914.
290. In Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), the Court said that due process required
that the legislative means be "reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals." Id. at 137. See also Chicago, B. & Q.R.R.
v. McGuire, 219 US. 549 (1911).
291. See Kales, "9Due Process," The Inarticulate Major Premise and the Adamson Act,
26 Yale L.J. 519 (1917). In his dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 US. 45 (1905), Mr.
Justice Holmes said that due process decisions "depend on a judgment or intuition more
subtle than any articulate major premise." Id. at 76.
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are considering the importance of legislative ends and to justify their opinions
in these terms. As Thomas Reed Powell has said:
Man is a rhetorical animal. But his rhetoric he uses to market his notions, not to
make them. So it is the factory and not the salesroom that I invite you to explore. It
is to the logic behind the rhetoric of constitutional law that I wish to direct your
attention.29
2
292. Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 15 J, of Philosophy,
Psychology & Scientific Method 654 (1918), in Essays in Constitutional Law 85, 87
(R. McCloskey ed. 1957).
